DELIBERATIVE RELEVANCE AND THE METAETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF DAMASIO'S WORK

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I. THE PROBLEM OF DELIBERATIVE RELEVANCE

All deliberation – and indeed, all action – occurs against a background of a restricted set of considerations. Sometimes, what matters most is clear, and no deliberative process is needed to determine what to do. Someone convinces you that the company whose stock you have invested in is likely to go bankrupt and you know immediately that you have to get your money out. Other times, deliberation proceeds against a background of relevant considerations. You might write these down in a list of 'pros' and 'cons' to help you decide, say, whether to leave your current job for a better-paying one elsewhere. And yet other times, deliberation seems necessary, but it is not at all clear what are the relevant factors to consider. You are not sure how to 'see' the situation, or 'how to think' about your options. The question arises of what is of value, or worth considering. Your spouse shocks you with the announcement that she is leaving you. You might have no idea how to respond, what to think about this situation. What do you want? What's important? You might begin deliberating before you have fully identified the relevant set of considerations and action options, or the identification of relevant considerations might be modified in the process of deliberation. Some potential reasons may be discarded as irrelevant, others may be discovered. The cases in which deliberation is forgone, or seems not necessary, are those in which the set of relevant features is so restricted that it is simply obvious what to do.

In each of these cases – whether or not deliberation seems called for, whether or not one has identified the relevant features of the choice situation – it is notable that not all considerations having to do with a choice situation *are* relevant to the choice. In other words, not all features of a situation are relevant to our reasons for acting. Moreover, it's not feasible that we always take into account all considerations that might in fact provide good reasons for action. But over and above these two observations (that not all considerations are relevant to our reasons and that in any case, we can't take them to be) it is notable that often half the job of convincing another that she should do something is accomplished merely by getting her to take certain considerations to be relevant, to seriously consider them. We might call these the *deliberatively relevant considerations*.[1] These are the features of a choice-situation on which our attention is, or should be, focused when we are deciding what to do. Some considerations that might be deliberatively relevant in other choice contexts are excluded from the purview of the deliberation in question. As Thomas Scanlon points out, even when deciding what to do seems to be a straightforward matter of deciding which of several considerations one wants most,

> when this is so in a particular case it is because a more general framework of reasons and principles determines that these considerations are the relevant ones

[1]Both Scanlon and Karen Jones speak of determining the 'starting points of deliberation'. Scanlon (1998) refers to this feature of practical reasoning as putting considerations on one's 'deliberative agenda' (46). In her dissertation, Jones (1994) presents an account of 'deliberative relevance', and speaks of the 'interpretation' of a situation, and the 'perception of features as reason-giving'. Henry Richardson's notion of 'specification' also seems to count as a type of this sort of phenomenon (1997). He argues that an agent's ends have a distinctive regulatory role to play in determining other ends in practical reason. As we will see, this sounds like the same phenomenon with which we and these other philosophers are concerned. McDowell, also, in his 1978, argues that *moral* reasons 'silence' other reasons – they set the deliberative agenda. (He mentions 'silencing' again in his 1979, 335.) To solve the same problem in a Kantian framework, Barbara Herman proposes 'rules of moral salience' in her (1993). [Cf. also Iris Murdoch (1970), Martha Nussbaum (1985: JPhil 82 (10); and "The discernment of perception" in Proceedings of Boston Area Colloq. in Phil. 1985)]

> on which to base a decision. Much of our practical thinking is concerned with figuring out which considerations are relevant to a given decision, that is to say, with interpreting, adjusting, and modifying this more general framework of principles of reasoning (52-53).[2]

Let's call the reasons we have for recognizing some considerations to be relevant and others not '*deliberative reasons*'.[3]

A notable fact about deliberative reasons is that they play a structuring role in practical reasoning. It has been suggested that all one's *goals* and *values* yield deliberative reasons, in the sense that they determine what the relevant considerations are; they help to frame the choice situation. Any of one's ends or aims, simply by virtue of being one's end or aim, could play a regulatory role in determining what considerations are relevant.[4] For example, Scanlon writes,

> Adopting an aim is not simply a matter of assigning a positive value to a certain class of results, which then compete, on the basis of this value, with other reasons of all kinds. Rather, when we adopt an end we form the intention of pursuing it as something which has a certain role in our life... (53).

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[2]Scanlon is properly interpreted as referring to the problem of relevance, concerning the ways in which reasons interact and work to constrain the considerations that might count as reasons. For example, Scanlon says that reasons for action depend on our acts of 'selection' (318), on the intentions that we form (69). So, too, with belief: 'So we are reflectively and unreflectively selective: noticing and retaining not everything but those things that have some kind of salience' (fn. 57, 381). On a cursory glance, it may seem as if Scanlon is here referring to the frame problem. But the frame problem is not specific to practical reasoning. Any sort of perception involves the exclusion of 'irrelevant' features. These are features that are irrelevant regardless of the other reasons one has adopted. To the extent that it poses a problem, the frame problem is one for both Humeans and non-Humeans alike.

[3] Note that I do not think that all reasoning involves deliberation, nor that deliberative reasons always figure in deliberations. But these reasons are available to deliberation, and help determine what frames the choice, when one engages in deliberation.

[4] Sometimes Scanlon speaks of this regulatory role on the structure of practical reasoning as a higher-order reason to count or discount certain considerations as relevant in deciding what to do. Sometimes Scanlon speaks of this as a 'decision, based on reasons, that determines the reason-giving force of other considerations…' (52).

Moral values, in particular, are thought to play an especially distinctive regulatory role. Scanlon argues that moral considerations 'shape our process of practical thinking' in part by stripping certain considerations that might be relevant in other contexts of their normative force in the present case (156). He says: 'Being moral involves seeing reason to exclude some considerations from the realm of relevant reasons (under certain conditions) just as it involves reasons for including others' (157). In this respect, Scanlon seems to be in agreement with John McDowell, who says that

> …the dictates of virtue… are not weighed with other reasons at all, not even on a scale which always tips on their side. If a situation in which virtue imposes a requirement is genuinely conceived as such…, then considerations which, in the absence of the requirement, would have constituted reasons for acting otherwise are silenced altogether – not overridden – by the requirement. (McDowell, 1978, 26)

McDowell argues that the difference between the ways in which a virtuous and a non-virtuous person perceive the same situation can't be that they are moved by different desires while they share the same beliefs. Rather, the virtuous person is distinguished by which sorts of considerations count as *reason-giving* for her. (Cf. McDowell, 1978 and 1979.)

As Scanlon points out, intentions play a similarly 'structuring' role; an agent's adoption of a particular intention makes a difference to the reasons that an agent has.[5] In Scanlon's words,

> When I have adopted a given plan, I have reason to do what will carry out that plan rather than what would have been involved in implementing some alternative

[5] I agree. But I think that this is a point in my favor, and not in Scanlon's. Recognizing the role of intentions, commitments, and the like in deliberation puts a powerful resource into the Humean's hands. Scanlon thinks that recognizing the special role of intentions poses is unproblematic for his account, because of the fact that these intentions are not, as Scanlon puts it, 'original sources of reasons'; rather, they depend (in part) upon further reasons.

> scheme, but these reasons depend on the considerations counting in favor of that plan *as well as on my having adopted it* (46, my emphasis).

Something similar results when someone puts a consideration 'on her deliberative agenda' (46), or, in my terms, when one recognizes a deliberative reason.

> Like having an intention, taking a consideration as relevant in this way affects the reasons one subsequently has, even though it is not an original source of reasons…. [W]e might say that if a person has selected certain considerations, and not others, to be relevant to deciding what to do in a given interval, then he or she subsequently has reason to treat these considerations (and not the others) as reasons (in the absence of reason to rethink this initial selection). (47)

So, Scanlon continues, 'taking' a consideration to be relevant has what he calls 'reason-shaping consequences' (47).[6]

Scanlon and others think that this feature of practical reason can be adequately captured only by a cognitivist theory of reasons. He argues that the Humean is particularly ill-equipped to accommodate this feature. According to *cognitivism*, a reason for action is in part constituted by an *evaluative belief* which ascribes properties and can be true or false. The content of such a belief contains an evaluative, or normative, term, such as 'good', 'wrong', and 'ought'. So, I have a reason for taking a walk only if I believe, say, that it is good for me to get some fresh air. According to *noncognitivism*, no such evaluative belief is needed. For example, my reason for going on a walk consists in my desiring to get fresh air. Noncognitivists deny that evaluative concepts refer to

[6] I completely agree. But this leaves us with the following pressing questions: (1) what is the nature of those reasons that one has for making the decision concerning what is relevant; and (2) what is the nature of the decision itself: since it 'shapes' the reasons one has, what grounds its reason-giving force? Scanlon explicitly recognizes only the first of these questions, and this is why he does not see how wide he has opened the door for the Humean. Implicitly, however, Scanlon does recognize that the taking of something to count as a deliberative reason itself contributes its own degree of normative force. And one wants to know what the best account of that structuring, shaping, deliberative reason is.

properties, and they hold that the function of evaluative judgments is not to state facts or make assertions which can be true or false. According to this view, a reason for action is properly characterized by reference to a person's desires, non-evaluative beliefs, and – as I've proposed – also affective states. By *affective states* I mean (at a minimum) the feelings that are associated with emotions.

[It is important to keep in mind that we are speaking here of *having* a first person reason. We are interested in what makes a person *subjectively* rational or irrational. In this chapter, I will focus specifically on deliberative reasons, rather than first order reasons. It has been claimed that noncognitivists have a particularly hard time accounting for deliberative reasons. But I want to say, on the contrary, that noncognitive emotions play an important role in structuring and determining deliberatively relevant reasons.[7] Some emotions can constitute deliberative reasons.]

This chapter has two projects. i) To defend the Humean account against Scanlon's attack, and ii) to argue that noncognitive factors are actually essential to identifying the reasons-giving features of a situation. As it turns out, I argue, the Humean is best equipped to account for the ubiquitous phenomenon of taking some restricted set of considerations to be relevant in deciding what to do. However, to see this, it will be helpful to undertake a third project here as well. iii) To show what is philosophically unhelpful about establishing the empirical claim that emotions are necessary for successful practical reasoning.

[7] It is because of deliberative reasons that one's reasons for acting are not all on a par. They are not to be weighed according to their respective strengths (however we want to characterize strength). Rather, once they are in play, deliberative reasons have an inertial force that makes a difference to the other reasons that an agent has. they have what Scanlon calls 'reason-shaping consequences.'(47)

II. RESPONDING TO SCANLON'S CHALLENGE.

Why can't the Humean, according to Scanlon, account for this special role that having aims or ends play in our deliberation? The answer Scanlon provides appeals to the existence of reasons to exclude other reasons from consideration. We will come to his argument shortly. Before we do, I want to draw attention to the fact that the particular way in which Scanlon spells out the role that ends play – and indeed, the very point that ends do play a special role in deliberation – is logically distinct from his point about the existence of a 'general framework of principles of reasoning'. For Scanlon, these three notions (the general framework, the role of adopting an end, and the existence of second order reasons that strip some reasons of any deliberative relevance) are all of a piece. They are each part of a consistent picture of deliberation that Scanlon holds to be correct. However, it is possible (1) that reasons do not play the sort of specific role Scanlon claims, and yet (2) that there is still a general framework of principles that govern relevance conditions in some other way. This means that after I argue for (1), I will have to address the possibility of (2).

So, to begin. Scanlon claims that the Humean cannot recognize the existence of a 'general framework of reasons and principles' that determines the considerations that are relevant to a decision (52). Scanlon tries to show that appealing to desires is insufficient to explain the phenomenon of taking certain considerations to be relevant in deciding what to do. To adequately explain this phenomenon, he thinks that we must take reasons to be basic, conceptually prior to desires.

His argument for this is the following. Scanlon claims that reasons can conflict in many more ways than desires, and the resolution of such conflict is correspondingly more complex and enriched in the case of reasons than in that of desires (50ff.). What sorts of ways of conflicting are possible among reasons for action that are not possible among desires? The answer is found in Scanlon's distinction between conflicts 'in the practical sense' and 'deeper' conflicts (24). According to Scanlon, the former sort of conflict is the only sort that is acknowledged on the Humean model of practical reasoning. 'Practical' conflicts recognize only what Scanlon calls *pro tanto reasons*, reasons that are matters of degree. These reasons may be overridden by other competing reasons, but they do not thereby lose their status as reasons. For example, even if I agree that I rationally ought to stay home to finish writing a class lecture, I wouldn't deny that there is *still* a reason for me to spend the time driving my friend to the airport. Choosing to write a lecture or drive a friend to the airport 'need not involve deciding that one of these competing reasons did not count or was not really a relevant consideration' (51). In practical conflicts, then, there is something to be said for each of the competing states of affairs being considered – each option provides a pro tanto reason – even though one must be chosen over the others. According to Scanlon, the Humean account can recognize only conflicts that are 'practical' in this sense, which, for him, is the same as saying that the only sort of reason recognized on the Humean account is a pro tanto reason.

Scanlon thinks the situation is entirely different with 'deeper' conflicts. In those, a reason in favor of an option actually strips another consideration of its reason-giving force. The reasons operative in such situations are what Scanlon calls *prima facie* – in the sense that it may turn out that some of these are not really reasons at all. On this view, a

consideration C can be a reason for not taking another consideration D to be relevant to one's decision. When such a reason is present, then the conflict between C and D is not merely 'practical'; it is 'deeper'. Scanlon explains, 'The reason-giving force of C not only competes with that of D; it urges that D lacks force altogether (at least in the given context)' (51). As I understand this, the following would count as an example of the sort of phenomenon Scanlon has in mind. Suppose I have an unusual opportunity to go on an expedition to the Sahara desert. This is something that I have wanted to do for a long time. That I have wanted such an opportunity is a consideration, D, in favor of making the trip. But suppose also that I have children, and that the only option for their care while I am gone is to leave them with a stranger. So there is another consideration, C, that not only competes with my desire to go, but is a reason for not counting it at all. In other words, my judgment that I have a reason to protect my children's well-being may make me see that I was wrong to think that I had any reason to go on an expedition to the Sahara. Seeing that doing so might jeopardize their well-being would obliterate the reason I initially thought I had to go on the expedition; it wouldn't count even for a little, when weighed against the safety of my children. Prima facie reasons are defeasible *as reasons*.[8]

Corresponding to the two sorts of conflict ('practical' and 'deep'), are two different models of conflict resolution: among pro tanto reasons, the method of resolution is that of weighing the respective strengths of the reasons; among absolute and prima facie reasons, the resolution of the conflict is in a sense built in to what Scanlon calls the

[8] The understanding of prima facie and pro tanto reasons here is the same as Shelly Kagan's in his (1989)

‘structural’ relations among them. Rather than being outweighed, the prima facie reasons are neatly ruled out.

So Scanlon's argument intertwines two distinct charges against Humeanism that we can take separately. One is that, as just explained, the Humean cannot recognize prima facie (as opposed to pro tanto) reasons. The other depends upon the assumption that the Humean model for resolving conflicts among reasons is that of weighing desires according to their strength alone. The charge is that the resolution of conflicting reasons cannot be taken to be simply a matter of balancing competing desires on the basis of their strength. I would like to respond to each of these charges. Let’s begin with the claim that the Humean cannot account for prima facie reasons.

Consider again the Sahara example. A Humean way of interpreting Scanlon's intuition is this. I am so unconflicted and resolute in my desire for the children's well-being that the desire to go to the Sahara presents no active competition. It is ‘not a reason’ in the sense of ‘not a currently competing reason’. In other words, it is a decisively overridden reason.

But that state of affairs is compatible with answering Yes to the question ‘Have you any (subjective) reason to travel?’ If this question were asked of me, barring additional contextual implications, then it would be quite odd to answer No. More than odd: it would be untrue. I am unconflicted about what to do, and this unconflicted state of mind makes it seem that my desire to go on the expedition has lost its reason-giving force altogether; it is completely irrelevant to my decision. But this unconflicted state is compatible with my desire’s remaining a pro tanto reason -- a reason to a certain extent. The reason provided by my desire to visit the Sahara is ‘not relevant’, because of my

resolute attitude[9] toward the children's well-being. So the Humean might say that Scanlon's phenomenology is compatible with the relevant reasons being, strictly speaking, pro tanto reasons.

There is a further consideration to bolster this intuitive analysis. Say my trustworthy aunt unexpectedly offers to fly across the country to stay at my house and take care of my children. I now seem to have a reason to go to the Sahara. (Presumably Scanlon would agree with this.) Where did this reason *come* from? On a Humean account, one could account for this reason naturally, basing it upon my long-standing desire to make such a trip. But on the rival account, the 'emergence' of such a reason would seem mysterious, given that my desire to make such a trip *gave* me no reason to make such a trip in the face of caring most about the well-being of my children. So my aunt's unexpected appearance brought with it a reason for me to go on the trip. The Humean account, in contrast, offers a better account of the etiology of such a subjective reason.

So, the Humean recognizes only pro tanto reasons, and not prima facie ones in the sense defined above. Scanlon is right about this. But does this mean that the Humean must say that all desires are always relevant reasons?[10] Before approaching this question, we must notice that – contrary to what Scanlon seems to think – to take a stand on the question of whether all reasons are pro tanto is not yet to answer the question Scanlon has

[9]Affect will be important in giving a full characterization of resoluteness. More on the role of affect in the following sections below.

[10] If 'being deliberatively relevant' is taken to mean 'counting as a reason (to at least some degree)' – as Scanlon seems to think – and if the Humean must say that all desires are pro tanto reasons, then it seems that the Humean must say that all desires are always relevant. And this would be to concede that the Humean cannot account for the phenomenon of deliberative relevance.

raised about the phenomenon of relevance. This is because we do not have to (and indeed, I see no reason to) accept Scanlon's conception of the relationship between reasons and relevance. I think we should distinguish what is deliberatively relevant from what counts as a reason. In that light, we can see that my reply to the pro tanto/prima facie issue is not a complete reply to the 'general framework' issue with which we began.

Are all reasons deliberatively relevant? Or can you have a reason to do x that is not deliberatively relevant? To me, trying to answer such a question seems like a mug's game: either the disagreement about the answer reduces to a verbal dispute, or it provides a front for discussing whether a certain consideration *should* be among those that are deliberatively relevant. If the latter is at issue, then the question isn't really about the nature of reasons (though it masquerades as that), but about the substantive normative issue of what should be taken to be a reason.

Here's one prominent example. Scanlon suggests that only a model of practical reasoning that takes reasons as basic can account for the phenomenon in which certain considerations are taken to be relevant to making certain decisions, while other considerations are ruled as irrelevant in certain contexts (or have restricted relevance). In doing so, he seems to take 'relevance' to mean counting as a reason, to a certain degree. His argument against the Humean seems ultimately to rely upon taking 'being deliberatively relevant' to mean 'counting as a reason (to at least some degree)'. On his conception of Humeanism, it would follow that all reasons would always be relevant, because they are all pro tanto reasons. (This is why he wants to insist that they are prima facie reasons, and not pro tanto – then it would be possible for only a small subset of them to be relevant.)

So if the Humean says that all reasons are pro tanto, and if we agree with Scanlon that pro tanto reasons, by virtue of carrying some weight as reasons, must be deliberatively relevant, then it seems that the Humean must say that all reasons are always relevant. And this would be to concede that the Humean *cannot* account for the phenomenon of deliberative relevance. I've argued that Scanlon is right that the Humean recognizes only pro tanto reasons. However – contrary to what Scanlon seems to think – to take a stand on the question of whether all reasons are pro tanto is not yet to answer the question raised about the phenomenon of relevance. This is because we do not have to (and indeed, I see no reason to) accept Scanlon's conception of the relationship between reasons and relevance. My position as a Humean is this. I want to allow that, though all desires provide reasons for action, they are not always deliberatively relevant. This brings us to the question of whether the Humean can account for deliberative relevance.

So let's re-focus the discussion on the phenomenon of deliberative relevance. I will argue that there is no reason why the structural role of deliberative reason cannot be the accommodated by a Humean account. This will allow me to respond to the second of Scanlon's charges identified above, to the effect that the Humean is committed to a simple weighing model of determining reasons on the basis of desire strength. In the second half of the talk, I will present some reason to think that affective states are *psychologically* essential to being able to determining at least some deliberative reasons. Finally, I will provide some reasons to think that affective states may also play a *normative* role in deliberation.

III. PSYCHOLOGY: SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF RELEVANCE

Ronald de Sousa (1979) argues that *emotions* serve to narrow down the set of considerations relevant to a specific occasion for deliberation. Indeed, they help determine whether deliberation is needed at all. This is primarily because, as he says, 'there is no such thing as fully determinate rationality' (135) In particular: 'No logic determines *salience*: what to attend to, what to inquire about.' (136)[11] In light of this, de Sousa offers the following hypothesis: 'the function of emotion is to fill gaps left by (mere wanting plus) 'pure reason' in the determination of action and belief.' (136) And the sort of 'gaps' that emotions fill are the identification and determination of what features of a situation are deliberatively relevant.[12, 13] Emotions can help us identify relevant features of a situation, and they can help us with how to 'see' a situation. Emotions can enhance our perception of relevant considerations both directly and indirectly.[14]

Recent neurological and psychological studies about the role of affective states in deliberation seem to support this view about the relation between emotion and deliberative reasons. Studies suggests that noncognitive, affective states are always needed for determinations of relevance (and thus for all decision-making, not to mention

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[11] 1979, 136. De Sousa uses 'salience' to refer to what I have been calling 'relevance'.

[12] De Sousa would not want to assimilate emotions to either beliefs or desires. Rather, he sees emotions as, in a sense, more basic that these other states, in that emotions influence the sorts of beliefs and desires that are entertained. Emotions help determine one's focus of attention. In his words: '*Emotions are determinate patterns of salience among objects of attention, lines of inquiry, and inferential strategies*' (137). This account helps to explain the importance of emotional expression and understanding of others: to know what emotions another is feeling is to 'have a guide to what they are likely to believe, attend to, and therefore want and do' (137-8).

[13] Michael Stocker also argues for the importance of emotions, and for affect in general, in a range of papers, and for slightly different reasons…. Cf. also D'Arms.

[14] Of course, they can also *distort* this perception. We will discuss this feature of the emotions in section 4, when we come to the normative evaluation of the role that emotions play in deliberation.

deliberation). Because of this, one might think these studies considerably aid the noncognitivists' job. I will argue here that they do not. I also believe that they do not support even de Sousa's claims, or at least, they may do so in a way that he should and would reject. I want to briefly present the neuropsychological evidence, and then argue that – contrary to initial appearances – it does not help the philosopher enough. Doing so will help us to see some of the conditions that must be met for a feeling to count as a reason.

In *Descartes' Error* (1994), the neurologist Antonio Damasio provides neuropsychological evidence that emotions (or, more generally, affective states) are responsible for our ability to determine relevance.[15] The 'error' Damasio refers to is to think that all that is needed in practical reasoning is a desired goal and a set of beliefs. The evidence Damasio cites suggests that one needs an emotional life as well as beliefs and desires, in order to be able to deliberate at all.

Damasio notes that those who have suffered damage to some part of the (ventral and medial sector of) the prefrontal lobe 'cannot generate emotions relative to the images conjured up by certain categories of situation and stimuli, and thus cannot have the ensuing feeling. This is borne out in clinical observations and special tests....' (138)[16] One and the same collection of neural systems seems to be responsible for *both* the ability to make practical decisions, and the capacity for experiencing emotions and feelings (70).

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[15] The 'error' Damasio refers to is to think that all that is needed in practical reasoning is a goal and a set of beliefs. The evidence Damasio cites suggests that one needs an emotional life as well as beliefs and desires, in order to be able to deliberate effectively.

[16]This is true both for patients with prefrontal damage, as well as those with limbic system damage (in the amygdala or anterior cingulate cortex) (138). The former group, however, are capable of experiencing a limited subset of emotions, and so may seem more normal to others. However, they do not experience emotions that are a result of experience and learning, i.e., almost the entire set of specifically adult emotions (what Damasio calls 'secondary emotions') (131-138).

[Damasio defines a feeling to be the subjective experience of an emotion, an experience that is occasioned by the emotion, but it not the same as it. Emotions are responses to internal and external perceptions. But these representations play no significant role in characterizing the emotion proper; it is nothing more than a chemical, neural, and somatic pattern of responses; it is not necessarily conscious or felt.[17]] In those rare cases in which emotional capacities are severely impaired, reason seems to break down at the stage of determining relevance. This leads Damasio to suggest that affect may be involved in every decision[18], even when it is not something of which we are consciously aware (185, 187ff., 234). Damasio makes it quite plausible that there are indeed 'calm passions', and not only that they exist, but that reason cannot function well without them. Most strikingly, there is no evidence that the damage to the emotional centers in the brain affects people's beliefs (including their evaluative beliefs) or their capacity for non-practical reasoning. As Damasio puts it at one point,

> The powers of [practical] reason [including the determination of relevance] and the experience of emotion decline together, and their impairment stands out in a neuropsychological profile within which basic attention, memory, intelligence,

[17] Damasio is not as clear as he should be about the relations between the three notions of emotions, feelings, and consciousness. I suspect his notion of 'emotion' is equivocal. [See his (1999) for examples of some of the difficulties engendered by his shifting terminology. When Damasio speaks of representations of the body (or soma), he seems to mean just emotional reactions. So the emotion is a bodily response. A feeling, by contrast, is the awareness of the connection between the representations of objects and the emotions (representations of bodily states). Cf. his 1994, p. 132. A feeling is the awareness of an emotion; it is the experiencing of the emotion. [cf. Damasio's 1999] Damasio's view of emotion is similar to that of William James, as Damasio proudly points out. Damasio does not seem to think that representations of objects (whether internal or external, present or garnered from memory) are essential to the nature of the emotion; rather, as with James' account, they provide only the eliciting conditions for triggering the bodily responses, which themselves constitute the emotion.

[18] This is oversimplifying a bit, since Damasio thinks that some states in the somatosensory cortex bypass actual bodily feeling and simulate it instead, producing what he calls an 'as if' or 'vicarious' feeling (184ff.). Also note that for Damasio, feeling (which I prefer to call affect) and emotion lie on a continuum of somatosensory experiences.

> and language appear so intact that they could never be invoked to explain the patients' failures in judgment (54).[19]

What the neuropsychological evidence suggests is that noncognitive, affective states are necessary for practical deliberation, that is, necessary in virtue of the fact that *they serve to narrow down the set of considerations that are deliberatively relevant*. Thus, we apparently have a preliminary answer to Scanlon's challenge, mentioned at the outset, concerning the 'general framework' that determines deliberative relevance. It seems plausible that our feelings and emotions provide such a framework, or at least, that the general framework of reasons cannot be exclusively cognitive. Given Damasio's results, there is reason to think that an exclusively cognitive framework of reasons would not be constant or effective. One simply would not be able to *decide well*, even when in full possession of all relevant (evaluative and non-evaluative) beliefs.

Damasio introduces the term 'somatic marker' to refer to a somatic (feeling) state that 'marks' a mental image, or thought. This happens, for example, when a thought about a bad outcome is connected with an experience of, say, "an unpleasant gut feeling" (173). This is what the somatic marker achieves, according to Damasio:

> It forces attention on the negative outcome to which a given action may lead, and functions as an automated alarm signal which says: Beware of danger ahead if you choose the option which leads to this outcome. The signal may lead you to reject, *immediately*, the negative course of action and thus make you choose among other alternatives. The automated signal protects you against future losses, without further ado, and then allows you *to choose from among fewer alternatives* (173).

[19] It is clear that, by 'the powers of reason', Damasio is referring to decision-making ability, and that he means this to include the determination of relevance. See also pp. 59-61 of his 'Emotion and reason in the future of human life' (1997).

So the somatic markers serve to help solve the problem of relevance. As Damasio emphasizes, somatic markers may not be *sufficient* for good decision-making (173). For one thing, basic attention and working memory are also needed.[20] However, somatic markers do seem *necessary* for proper decision-making; there is evidence that their absence substantially reduces "the accuracy and efficiency of the decision process" (173). Damasio's somatic-marker hypothesis is controversial, and further empirical results are needed to establish its truth. I have presented it here because it is one possible model of how the emotions play a role in deliberation.

However, one might disagree with Damasio's conception of feelings and emotions as perceptions of bodily disturbances. One might hold, rather, that the somatic states Damasio invokes are not intrinsic to the nature of the experience – despite the fact that they are highly correlated with the experience. For people who think that emotional states are mental phenomena that are conceptually distinct from physical changes in the body, the somatic-marker hypothesis may seem neither compelling nor of much significance to

[20]The interplay between these (attention, memory, and feeling) is complicated. Here is Damasio's conception of the relationship:

> Without basic attention and working memory there is no prospect of coherent mental activity, and, to be sure, somatic markers cannot operate at all, because there is no stable playing field for somatic markers to do their job. However, attention and working memory probably continue to be required even after the somatic-marker mechanism operates. They are necessary for the process of reasoning, during which possible outcomes are compared, ranking of results are established, and inferences are made. In the full somatic-marker hypothesis, I propose that a somatic state, negative or positive, caused by the appearance of a given representation, operates not only as a *marker for the value of what is represented, but also as a booster for continued working memory and attention*. The proceedings are "energized" by [somatic] signs that the process is actually being evaluated, positively or negatively, in terms of the individual's preferences and goals.... In other words, in normal individuals, somatic markers which arise out of activating a particular contingency boost attention and working memory throughout the cognitive system (197-8).

the questions about the role of the emotions. I myself find Damasio's model appealing.[21] However, it can be distinguished from his more general point, that emotions are necessary for effective deliberation. And indeed, much of his evidence is should be taken seriously by those who hold a non-body-based conception of the emotions (e.g., the self-reports of those with certain damage to the brain, to the effect they do not feel certain emotions though they recognize the appropriateness of such feeling, or remember that they used to feel, say, disturbed, at prospects towards which they now have an 'affectless' attitude.) So I would like to stress that one need not accept the specific somatic-marker hypothesis to accept the more general point that emotions play an essential role in rational deliberation.

Damasio's evidence neither supports non-cognitivism nor helps to solve what we identified above as the problem of deliberative relevance. Here's why.

The practical indispensability of emotions is prima facie compatible with cognitivism. Just as we need certain neural networks, which are not cognitive but do not thereby make a mental process that depends on them noncognitive – so might many cognitive states rely upon affective states: on capacities such as those for empathy, fear, sadness, anguish, anger, embarrassment, awe. Let's grant the controversial hypothesis that all normal mental functioning – or at least all processes that constitute anything like effective deliberation – is infused with the noncognitive: feelings, emotions, affectively-based intuitions and the like. Moreover, let's grant the even more radical claim that these noncognitive elements are necessary to the very possibility of carrying out effective

[21] CK cf. also Shallice and Burgess (1993, paper in Fowles, Sutker, and Goodman, eds. *Progress in experimental personality and psychopathology research*, vol 17, pp. 285-311), cited by Damasio as proposing "that some form of marker is needed in decision-making," though it may be different from Damasio's form.

deliberation: that without one's capacity for emotion, for example, one would not be able to make the relevant practical inferences no matter how much time one took. These points need not threaten the fundamental tenet of cognitivism, that reasons are present in virtue of one's evaluative beliefs and not noncognitive states. It may still be true that having an evaluative belief is what having a reason is. So one response to the noncognitivist who relies upon Damasio is to grant that noncognitive states are necessary for narrowing down the set of deliberatively relevant features, but to deny that these could serve as normative reasons.

In other words, we can distinguish between two very different claims about deliberative relevance. The first is a claim about a psychological fact.

1. Deliberation must proceed against a background of a *restricted set of considerations*, in which some potential reasons are automatically excluded from one's 'deliberative agenda'.

The second claim points to a *normative* feature of our reasoning.

2. We often have *reason* to restrict the set of relevant reasons. That is, we often have a reason to highlight certain considerations and exclude others from our deliberations. This is what I am calling a 'deliberative reason'.

Perhaps Damasio's work provides the material for explaining the psychological fact; but how could his data help to establish the normative fact? The point here can be brought out more forcefully with the following considerations.

How can a feeling state be a reason for anything? Feelings can often help *explain* why we act the way we do. For example, say I know that a certain person will be at a party who makes me so uncomfortable that I will not be able to enjoy myself. So I may avoid going to the party because I would feel too uncomfortable. But here, the feeling of

discomfort is the *object* of my reason; it does not itself constitute the having of the reason. Similarly, I may stand up because my leg has fallen asleep; the feeling of pins and needles gives me good reason to move. But here the feeling is the object of my reason; it does not itself constitute the having of the reason. And in this case, if I did not want to get rid of that particular sensation, I would have no reason to move. These examples do not touch upon the further, metaethical, question with which we are here concerned: namely, what is the nature of the having of the reason to avoid the party? It is just a cognitive state? Or something else?

It seems that a feeling is a subjective reason only if it subjectively justifies the action. But can feelings *justify* our actions? Can they provide good reasons for us to act? In particular, can they help account for the fact that we often have *good reason* to deliberate within a restricted set of reason-giving considerations? [22]

Let's look directly now at the reasons why Damasio's evidence could not provide an answer to the normative problem of deliberative relevance.

IV. PROBLEMS WITH APPEALING TO DAMASIO'S THEORY

The metaethical cognitivist can point to several features of Damasio's account that render *his* notion of feeling, at least, unlikely to be capable of being normative. One, the notion of feeling at play in Damasio's theory seems to lack a necessary feature of being able to serve as a reason: availability to consciousness. And two, it does not conform to our

[22] Here are the reasons philosophers have offered for why not:
i) reasons are rationally evaluable, feelings are not.
ii) any reason-candidate must be intentional: it must represent something about the world.
iii) reasons must be available to consciousness.
Mere feelings, it seems, do not satisfy any of these conditions.

ordinary conception of 'feeling' or 'emotion', and this poses the threat of eroding the distinction between the cognitive and noncognitive.

We can see the first point by considering the difference between largely unconscious motivational processes, and those that are available to consciousness. The former, one might argue, are not a threat to the cognitivist. Only the latter might pose a threat.[23] To the extent that the role of affect in Damasio's cases is largely unconscious or non-conscious, it does not seem to have much to do with rationality. This is because *availability*, or accessibility, to consciousness is central to what can count as a reason. To the extent that there is nothing potentially available to consciousness, and therefore nothing potentially available to deliberation, the process doesn't figure in rationality. In his 1980 paper, de Sousa is aware of a similar objection to the one I am raising here concerning Damasio's work. De Sousa recognizes that establishing that 'our emotions underlie our rational processes' and that they have a biological purpose (141), does not itself show that emotions are rationally assessable.

The second worry is that the affective states in Damasio's theory might erode the distinction between the cognitive and noncognitive. If Damasio is right, then the role of the emotions in practical reasoning is never eliminable. Feelings and emotions would play an essential role in every determination about what is relevant in one's practical deliberation. It's worth mentioning here that de Sousa holds a similar view in this

[23]And, the anti-Humean needn't stop there. For it is by no means obvious, she will go on to say, that even if noncognitive factors play a conscious role, they are thereby reasons. For, it might be that they could not be reasons unless an appropriate cognitive factor is present. Of course, the Humean would respond by saying that those cognitive factors are not reasons unless they are tied to appropriate noncognitive states. And then we would be back to the clash of conflicting intuitions. But that might be all right for the Humean if the point is just to rebut a cognitivist objection to the Humean position (that it cannot explain the phenomenon of relevance).

regard[24]; he seems to suggest that the role of the emotions in practical reasoning is never eliminable, that emotions play an essential role in every determination about what is relevant in one's practical deliberation. But this seems problematic. Prima facie, it would seem that lots and lots of deliberative choices do not involve any feelings or emotions at all. If we're *always* having an emotion when reasoning, then that notion of 'emotion' is not engaging the present debate. If we say that we are always having an emotion, even a 'calm' one, then we lose our intuitive grasp on what an 'emotion' is. Stocker, too, has argued that affective states are central to even the most abstract of intellectual activities…. The question then arises whether he and Damasio have the same notion of affect, and if it is playing the same sort of role….. Both of them seem to face the objection I'm raising, that there is a distinction between emotion and reason which we want to keep intact for various philosophical and meaning-driven practices and purposes.[25]

Another respect in which Damasio's 'feelings' do not seem to pick out what we mean by 'feeling' can be seen in the following concern. How are we to identify the feelings involved in determining deliberative relevance? The states Damasio invokes in his theory are somatic states, and so do not have enough representational content, or have the right sort of content, to be individuated as feeling states. Clearly, *mere* feelings do not

[24] Though in other respects his view is at odds with Damasio's. According to de Sousa, it may be possible that emotions, as patterns of attention, can be felt. But this need not be the case. And indeed, we see him expressing discomfort with the view that emotions are somatic states of which we have some dim phenomenological awareness (139). De Sousa is explicitly about not favoring the understanding of emotions as somatic states, consisting 'largely in autonomic reasons...' (139). [There is an ambiguity here in the cognitive/noncognitive distinction: One at the intentional level, the other subdoxastic.]

[25] It might be mentioned that in the end Stocker, I believe, largely avoids this problem, mainly through his rigorous adherence to the actual phenomenology of affect and affective states. But he also leaves open the question whether we are always feeling an emotion.

have enough intentional content to play an interesting role in deliberation. To have a hope of playing a normative role, these 'feeling' states must have intentional content, they must represent or be *about* the world in some way. [See also D'Arms on the capacity of the emotions to 'make salient particular features of the situation in virtue of which' some action seems a rational response. 'They present themselves not as mere urges, but as responses to features of an agent's situation whose salience the emotion itself helps to point up. … what makes it the case that Angus is angry… is that he takes himself to have reason to behave that way in virtue of some slight against himself (etc.)….' (3)]

Each of these objections leaves us with a minimal constraint on what counts as a normative reason. One, whatever constitutes a reason must have *intentional content*. And two, it must be in principle *available to consciousness*. Both of these conditions are met by emotions: they are intentional, object-directed states, and they are available to consciousness.

In sum, affective states may somehow be essential to our keeping in mind the relevant features of a situation, and they may serve to narrow these down. But this does not itself establish that such states play a normative role. So the task remains: to show that at least some emotions – taken as object-directed, occurrent states available to consciousness – can give us subjective normative *reasons* to add or exclude certain features from our deliberations.

V. NORMATIVITY: SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF DELIBERATIVE RELEVANCE

I will offer for your intuitive assessment a case in which an emotion seems to provide a reason even though there is no plausible evaluative belief present. At the very

least, I take the picture I will sketch to pose a challenge to the cognitivist who wants to maintain that affective states cannot provide subjective, normative reasons for action.

Jonathan Bennett (1974) presents various cases of conflict between what he calls one's 'sympathy' (feeling for fellow human suffering) and one's 'morality' (system of general principles that one genuinely endorses, and which govern what might be called one's 'conscience'). In Mark Twain's story, Huckleberry Finn's conscience is governed by a 'bad morality'. According to Huck's morality, which he has unreflectingly inherited from his society, slave owners have property rights over their slaves, and the slaves, in virtue of being black, have no value as persons. Despite this belief system, Huck befriends a slave named Jim, and helps him to escape from slavery. But as he helps him escape, Huck finds himself increasingly bothered by his conscience, which urges him to 'do the right thing' and turn Jim in.

As Huck sees it, the *reasons* are all on the side of 'morality'. On the other side are feelings of sympathy and compassion and friendship. Because this is how Huck sees his predicament, *he* does not think that he is justified in acting as his feelings urge him to. He thinks, in fact, that he is wicked to do so, and he takes himself to be weak-willed for not doing what he thinks he clearly ought to do: turn Jim in. We think that Huck is right to act out of his sympathy for Jim, and wrong to act as his moral judgment dictates. But let's stay focused on Huckleberry's *subjective* reasons. From his perspective, Huck is not justified in freeing Jim; doing so would be inconsistent with his reflective judgment. However, emotions need not amount to anything so strong as an all-things-considered judgment in order to serve a normative role in deliberation. I take this case, in fact, to illustrate an interesting and important feature of having reasons: *one can have reasons*

without necessarily being able to formulate them as judgments. I am not saying that such reasons are not accessible to consciousness; in fact, we are often all too aware of them, as Huck was, but not *as* reasons. Huckleberry Finn's emotional response is not very articulate. He is conscious of acute feelings, what we might call 'pangs of sympathy', but he is not very familiar with their cognitive content. He just 'feels sick'.

My view is that the feelings of Huck Finn *do* provide him with a normative reason – indeed, a deliberative reason – to act as he does. To see this point, perhaps it will help to consider another case presented by Bennett in the same paper. Feelings of sympathy and a conscience informed by a bad morality were in conflict, with exactly the opposite – horrific – result, in the case of Heinrich Himmler, while in command of the system of concentration camps during the Nazi regime. Himmler found his reflective, all-things-considered judgments about what ought to be done difficult to implement, because of his emotional reactions. Himmler was so bothered by the difficulty that he tried to give counsel on how to deal with these feelings of sympathy for the Jews while continuing to carry out the odious policies. Here is part of Himmler's own description of what he saw as the great risk to the 'minds and souls' of the leaders and executioners of the concentration camps.

> The danger was considerable, for there was only a narrow path between the Scylla of their becoming heartless ruffians unable any longer to treasure life, and the Charybdis of their becoming soft and suffering nervous breakdowns. (Cited in Bennett, 509)

Here is what I find interesting about this case, something that I have not seen anyone point out, even though this example has been extensively discussed in the literature. The following observation is central to my argument. Learning that many people, and

Himmler himself, had such emotions, tends to induce a rather strong third-person normative judgment about these people. For the two hundred or so students that I have informally surveyed, knowledge about the emotional reactions just described elicits an *additional* layer of horror and outrage to that already present when one knows merely *what* these people did and were attempting to do. What does it contribute to our assessment to know that the policies of the Nazis made so many of them consistently experience such bad feelings? Here's one thing this fact plausibly adds to our understanding. The existence of these emotions in this context indicates that these people *knew what they were doing*. On some level, they *recognized* Jewish people as fellow persons of value. The emotions seem to indicate that these people had the resources to see that what they were doing was wrong from their own perspective, however much their arguments and ambitions, political and ideological political fervor would not let them.

Our knowledge of those emotions could not play such a role in our evaluation of Himmler and the others if we did not think that affective states could constitute reasons. Learning of the pangs of sympathy present tends to produce two dominant reactions. On the one hand, it makes Himmler and the rest seem in certain respects morally better: less 'inhuman' – one has hope that their opinions might be changed, and so on. On the other hand, it makes Himmler seem morally worse. His ability to cordon off such strong and unpleasant feelings makes him seem all the more evil. He seems worse because his normative conviction is so strong. Whether you have one or the other reaction, in either case, you are thereby demonstrating a commitment to regarding emotions as serving a subjective normative role. In the first case, remember, knowledge of Himmler's emotions gives some hope that such a person could change for the better, and could do so for good

subjective reasons. But knowing of his emotions could not produce such a hope, unless we thought that drawing upon the emotions could help one rationally to change one's reasons. In general, emotional appeals would not provide justificatory reasons if emotions didn't partly constitute such reasons. In the second instance, Himmler's overriding of those emotions can make him seem so much morally worse only if emotions carry some normative force. One might object that the impediments posed by the emotions here are merely causal, not normative. But this is to treat emotions as obstacles to action on a par with non-normative obstacles, which they are clearly not. Consider the difference in our attitude if we knew instead that Himmler had to overcome severe exhaustion, say, or a physical impediment. *That* would seem very different from knowing that he experienced agony and sympathy, and it would not produce the same changes in our moral verdict.[26] Moreover, that these are *genuine* normative effects is supported by the fact that one could say in advance how the moral evaluation depends on the presence of the relevant emotion.[27]

The feelings of these people made certain considerations deliberatively relevant, which they tried systematically to ignore. They exhibit a kind of internal incoherence. They seem to be subjectively – and not just from a third person perspective – irrational. Bennett says of Himmler,

[26] A similar case can be made when reading the letters and diaries of slaveholders in the United States who claimed to believe that black people were not full persons. Their emotional reactions betray the fact that falsity of this claim was fully available to them, and fully available to play a normative role in their deliberations. [Cf. Howard McGary 'Forgiveness' (1989) APQ 26 (4) 343-351.]

[27] Thomas Nagel proposes a similar criterion for genuineness in moral judgment in 'Moral Luck' in *Mortal Questions*.

> Although his policies ran against the human grain to a horrible degree, he did not sandpaper down his emotional surfaces so that there was no grain there, allowing his actions to slide along smoothly and easily. He did, after all, bear his hideous burden, and even paid a price for it. He suffered a variety of nervous and physical disabilities, including nausea and stomach-convulsions, and [his doctor] Kersten was doubtless right in saying that these were 'the expression of a psychic division which extended over his whole life.' (510)

It seems to me that these feelings of revulsion or pity or whatever intolerable feeling is experienced when one sees the results of following certain principles – these feelings constitute part of what it *is* to value others.[28] When they are not consciously recognized as such – as both Huck Finn and Himmler fail to do – we feel some gross (first-personal) error is being made, over and above our evaluation of the actions themselves. In both these cases, deliberative reasons that the agents clearly *have* are not explicitly recognized as such. Let me emphasize that my point is *not* that we are making a third-person judgment that they *should* recognize these (though we may do that too); rather, the idea is that these people are *subjectively* irrational. They are not recognizing reasons that they have from their own first-person perspective. If this is right, then it follows that on my view one can be mistaken about one's reasons, about the subjective reasons that one has.

All I am concerned to suggest at this point is that at least some affective states can give one reason to revise one's field of reasons, the set of considerations that one takes to

[28] At least, for creatures like us.

be reason-giving. Affective states not only can cause us to revise our judgments, but can do so with good reason.

At this point, a common objection seems relevant. Before closing, I'd like to consider an objection. Many will think that this position is unstable. They will say that I have not properly appreciated the significance of the fact – a fact I admit – that affect can often enough lead us in the wrong direction, and distort our field of reasons. Let's look at this more closely.

The example of Huck Finn is often appealed to as a case in which emotions serve to correct the agent's moral principles.[29] Certainly, emotions can serve this role; they can redirect attention and enable the identification of deliberatively relevant features. (Indeed that is what makes them featured in this paper.) But they do not do so necessarily. Sometimes emotions seem to contribute to failures to perceive the deliberatively relevant features of a choice situation. They can prevent one from seeing what is important. This oscillating role of the emotions should alert us immediately to the possibility that emotions do not automatically count as normative reasons. Even when they have a good influence, it is not clear that they deserve the status of justificatory reasons.

The noncognitivist is challenged to answer the following question. What determines when an emotion has *aided* practical deliberation? The worry is that the noncognitivist will not have the resources to answer such a question. In contrast, the anti-noncognitivist has an answer ready-made. This is how a cognitivist might put it: 'Emotions play a proper role when they yield the right answer, which can, in principle, be

[29]Cf. Bennett (1974), Jones (1994), and Nomy Arpaly (2003). In October 1998, Peter Railton presented a paper at NYU that seeks to ground a noncognitive account of deliberation in part on his analysis of Huck Finn.

determined independently of the emotion. If we are the sort of being that needs the influence of the emotions to correctly perceive what has value, so be it. Nothing that has been said so far shows that the emotions *constitute* such value.'

In part, I want to reject the premise of the question. Such emotions indicate values even when those values are bad ones. If we want to talk about what can serve a normative role, we should stay focused on that – and not on whether those are good reasons. On the other hand, if we want to insist upon a third-person normative criticism, then of course I can agree that emotions lead astray. But then it must be as readily admitted that reason can lead astray as well, with equally horrible consequences.[30]

Again, the challenge here is that there is something that constitutes a rational or irrational choice, and that this will not necessarily be determined by the process that produced the decision. These processes will sometimes produce rational results, sometimes irrational ones. We can't declare all the responses dictated by the emotions as rational, even if these do play a central, even essential, explanatory role in whatever counts as being rational. Some cases, like that of Huck Finn, seem right to count as cases where one's emotional response is tracking one's reasons; but some cases will not count this easily.

But the noncognitivist will see no reason to abandon noncognitivism at this level. This is because the very evaluation of when emotions *aid* deliberation can itself be said to be determined by noncognitive states. When a cognitivist picks out a single discrete desire or emotion, and calls it irrational (or non-rational), she is not being fair to the noncognitivist, since there are *other* noncognitive states in virtue of which the original

[30] If this isn't already obvious, take a quick look at neurologist Donald B. Calne's *Within Reason: Rationality and Human Behavior* (Pantheon, 1999) for illustrations of the point.

desire or emotion is deemed irrational. An emotion will often look like it is failing to help rational deliberation, but only because other affective states are determining what is valuable. Thus, the fact that we seem to think that we can determine, at least ex post facto, whether an emotion aided deliberation does nothing to cast any doubt upon the noncognitivist account. The very judgment that an emotion played a proper role can itself be given a noncognitive interpretation.

Let me finish by emphasizing a fundamental difference between the noncognitivist and cognitivist. That affective states do not *invariably* help practical deliberation forces the *cognitivist* to see the role of affect as extrinsic and almost accidental, even arbitrary. (At most, the cognitivist might say that the emotions can sometimes serve a purely heuristic role of tracking one's reasons.) I believe it is extremely unlikely that there are general principles of 'reason' that determine when an emotion points in the right direction and when it does not. We agree that Huck's got it right. But there is no general principle to guide the normative claim that emotions *should* be regulative. Nonetheless, it is important to emphasize, the relation between Huck's sympathy and his reason to help Jim is non-accidental. Rather, Huck's sympathy for Jim is of a piece with the moral valuing of people as people. The cognitivist has to deny that sympathy (such as Huck's for Jim) is *even in part* constitutive of the moral valuing of people as people. Quite independently of philosophical argument, this is hard to accept.